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COMMENTS
FUNDING LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR:
FLORIDA'S IOTA PROGRAM-NOW IS THE TIME TO
MAKE IT MANDATORY
GREGORY A. HEARING
OTA is the acronym for Florida's Interest on Trust Account pro-
gram, wherein client trust funds are pooled to generate interest to
be used to provide legal services to the poor and for other public
purposes. Lawyers have been depositing client funds in trust ac-
counts for generations. Typically, if a client's funds are significant in
amount, they are deposited in a separate interest-bearing account. If
they are not, the funds are placed in a non interest-bearing trust ac-
count with other client funds also relatively small in amount. A typi-
cal IOTA plan pools these small or short-term amounts in one
interest-bearing demand account. Interest earned is transferred to
the state bar or state bar foundation which distributes it to various
organizations to subsidize legal aid programs.
During its brief existence, 2 Florida's program has survived com-
plex trust, tax and banking law problems and has overcome charges
that the program's use of funds generated by the commingling of
client trust funds violates professional ethics rules. The IOTA pro-
gram, however, faced its greatest challenge in Cone v. Florida Bar.3
In Cone, which commenced in 1984, Ms. Evelyn Glaeser claimed
that the $2.25 interest generated on her $13.75 principal held in trust
by the law firm of Holland & Knight and used in Florida's IOTA
1. For the sake of clarity, this author will use the IOTA acronym to denote all pro-
grams, whether labeled IOTA or IOLTA. Although the IOLTA acronym is used more widely,
at least one commentator has called it a misnomer, stressing that what is involved in all pro-
grams is not interest on lawyer trust accounts, but rather interest on client trust funds held by
lawyers. Marsh, IOLTA Should Be Rejected, 70 A.B.A. J. 16 (1984).
2. Florida's IOTA program was first authorized by judicial rule in 1978 in In re Interest
on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978), but was not implemented until 1981. In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
3. 626 F. Supp. 132 (M.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1002 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 268 (1987).
338 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:337
program was taken without just compensation. 4 Glaeser, however,
failed to persuade the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida' and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals6 that
the use of her money constituted a violation of the taking clause of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.' Recently,
the United States Supreme Court denied her petition for certiorari,8
thereby drawing to a close the "taking" controversy which had shad-
owed the IOTA program for years.
Glaeser's challenge to the IOTA program was watched closely by
both laymen and lawyers for two principal reasons: hers was the first
such challenge to be heard in the federal courts 9 and, by the summer
of 1988, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia had fol-
lowed Florida's lead and adopted IOTA programs. 0 When Florida's
program withstood constitutional scrutiny in the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, IOTA programs nationwide dodged a potentially
fatal blow. Nonetheless, the future of the IOTA concept is unclear.
Participation in Florida's voluntary program has been low, resulting
4. Id. Ms. Glaeser also alleged that the IOTA program violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and constituted conversion of property and breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. at 133 n.2.
5. See Cone, 626 F. Supp. 132.
6. See Cone, 819 F.2d 1002.
7. U.S. Co~tsT. amend. V. It is well settled that the fifth amendment applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155
(1980).
8. Cone v. Florida Bar, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987).
9. IOTA programs have been challenged in at least one adversarial state court proceed-
ing, Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 213 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Chapman v. State Bar of Cal., 474 U.S. 848 (1985), and deemed consti-
tutionally sound by several state supreme courts in non-adversarial judicial proceedings, in-
cluding the Supreme Court of Florida. See, e.g., Florida: In re Interest on Trust Accounts,
402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); Iowa: In re Iowa State Bar Ass'n, No. 84-1641 (Iowa 1984), cert.
denied sub nom. Ronwin v. Supreme Court of Iowa, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985); Massachusetts: In
re Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 395 Mass. 1, 478 N.E.2d 715 (1985); Minnesota: In re Minnesota
State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982); New Hampshire: In re New Hampshire Bar
Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982); Utah: In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
672 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983); Washington: In re Adoption of Amendments to CPR DR 9-102,
102 Wash. 2d 1101 (1984).
10. These 48 states together with the District of Columbia had generated $136 million as
of June 1988. In 1987 alone, IOTA programs nationwide disbursed $41.8 million for legal
services to the poor. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, No. 72,671, at 2 (Fla. filed July 5,
1988) (petition to amend rules) [hereinafter 1988 Petition to Amend Rules]. The only two
states which have not yet adopted IOTA programs, Indiana and West Virginia, are currently
considering doing so. Only 30 of the 49 IOTA programs have developed to the point where
they are disbursing the money raised. Marcotte, Big Interest in Small Change, 73 A.B.A. J.
70, 71 (1987).
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in only minimal realization of financial potential." In addition, tech-
nological advances in the banking industry could make subaccount-
ing of the IOTA funds cost-effective and perhaps raise new "taking"
questions.
In this Comment, the author surveys the nature of IOTA pro-
grams in other jurisdictions, reviews the development of Florida's
IOTA program and examines the recent "taking" challenge. Finally,
the author considers the future of the IOTA concept in general and
the particular need for a mandatory IOTA program in Florida.
I. THE NATURE OF IOTA: BACKGROUND
It is common for a lawyer to receive thousands of dollars from
clients in advance to cover costs and expenses to be incurred in such
matters as real estate closings, filing fees, and litigation settlements.
These funds, held in trust for the clients, are typically nominal in
amount or held for such short periods of time that administrative
costs would exceed the interest earned if such deposits were placed in
separate accounts. 12 Consequently, most lawyers pool these client
funds in non interest-bearing checking accounts."
The IOTA concept evolved to tap this potentially large financial
resource. A common plan pools lawyer trust accounts into an inter-
est-bearing account. The interest earned is transferred to a state bar
foundation, 4 which distributes the funds to organizations which use
the money for legal aid to the poor or for other law-related public
purposes. 5 The principal rationale behind the plan is to put the
11. The percentage of attorneys participating in Florida's program has actually dropped
from 21% in 1985 to 200o in 1986, where it remained in 1987. 1988 Petition to Amend Rules,
supra note 10, at 4.
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982), re-
printed in 68 A.B.A. J. 1502 (1982) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 348]. A lawyer would have
to spend time to (1) determine whether investment were practical, (2) open an account for the
client, (3) obtain the client's social security or tax identification number, and (4) perform
other bookkeeping tasks.
13. Id.
14. Florida's plan dictates that The Florida Bar Foundation receive the interest. In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978). However, bar foundations are not
necessarily the only entities designated recipients of the funds: the State Bar of California, the
Maryland Legal Services Corporation, and the Minnesota Supreme Court are recipients in
their respective states. California: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6212 (West Supp. 1984); Mary-
land: MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (1982); Minnesota: In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n,
332 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. 1982).
15. Florida's determination that the funds be used for legal aid to the poor, improvement
of the administration of justice and for law student loans is typical. See In re Interest on Trust
Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1979). Yet some states have designated at least a portion of the
interest earned for other purposes. Maine's program permits lawyers to earmark interest
earned for any charitable, nonprofit program. North Carolina has designated some funds to
improve attorney grievance procedures. Other states have used interest to fund mediation pro-
jects. Marcotte, supra note 10, at 71.
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money to public use rather than to allow the banking industry to
benefit from free use of the money. 6
Implementation of the IOTA program has not come easily. Its
very existence contradicts a doctrine which "has been drilled into
every lawyer since time immemorial: thou shalt in no way tamper
with a client's money." 1 7 Nevertheless, in 1982 the ABA Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the Committee) declared
participation in an IOTA program to be ethical."' The Committee
found nothing in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) to prohibit an attorney's placing a client's funds in an
interest bearing account, provided the Model Code's Disciplinary
Rule 9-102, which bars lawyers from mishandling client funds, is not
breached.19 The Committee stressed that "[tihe thrust of D.R. 9-102
is that lawyers must neither misuse a client's funds nor impede their
prompt delivery. The focus is on safekeeping, accounting, and deliv-
ery, and not on investment of the funds."120 The Committee, how-
ever, pointed out that lawyers can not set up pooled trust funds and
retain the interest for themselves. 2' Citing two informal decisions 2
concerning the use of interest earned on client trust funds under
Canon 11, the Committee concluded that those decisions would be
the same under the Model Code. 23
Participation in the IOTA plan must be within the sole discretion
of the lawyer, as any client participation in this decision would sub-
ject the client to tax liability on earned interest through the assign-
ment of income doctrine. 24 Often the decision whether funds are
16. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1978).
17. Rivlin, LO.L.T.A. Gains Momentum Nationwide, 69 A.B.A. J. 1036 (1983).
18. See ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 12, at 1502.
19. Id. at 1502 (discussing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102
(1980)).
20. Id. at 1503.
21. Id. The Committee relied on Canon 11, which provides in pertinent part: "Money of
the client ... or other trust property ... should not under any circumstances be commingled
with [the lawyer's] own or be used by [the lawyer]." Id. (citing CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS Canon 11 (1908)).
22. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Dec. 545 (1962) (even where it is
impossible to allocate the interest earned on pooled client funds among clients, a lawyer who
retains the interest would be acting in violation of Canon 11); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 991 (1967) (a lawyer's use of interest earned on a pooled client fund
savings account to defray costs of a law firm's agency account would violate Canon 11).
23. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 12, at 1504. The Committee noted that,
"[a]lthough D.R. 9-102 does not carry forward the precise language from Canon 11 .. the
disciplinary rule, when read in its entirety, clearly continues the strict requirements for notice,
accounting, and prompt payment of funds to the client" set forth in Canon 11. The Commit-
tee also noted that there was "no intention by the drafters of the Model Code to relax in any
manner the long-standing restrictions on a lawyer's use of client funds." Id.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 54-58 (discussing IRS rulings that relate to IOTA).
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sufficiently nominal or short-term rests with the lawyer and is pro-
tected from judicial review. 25 However, the extent to which a lawyer
has discretion to determine what constitutes a sufficiently nominal
amount or a short-term period is unclear. In Cone, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit determined that $13.75 was nominal-but is $50 or $100? More-
over, the court did not discuss what length of time it would consider
short-term. 26 Lack of guidelines may be part of the reason why ap-
proximately eighty percent of Florida lawyers don't participate in the
IOTA program.2 7
Maryland is one state which has established firm guidelines for
making such decisions. Based on a study of the costs of opening in-
dividual client trust accounts, a fifty-dollar "safe harbor" amount
was established. 28 The Maryland legislature determined that where
the amount and anticipated length of deposit would combine to gen-
erate at least fifty dollars, thereby exceeding the cost of setting up
and maintaining the individual account, the funds should be depos-
ited in an account bearing interest for the client. If the amount and
anticipated length of deposit were insufficiently large, the funds
would be deposited to generate funds for IOTA. 29 This figure may be
helpful for those who participate in Florida's IOTA plan, as Florida
has no such specific guidelines. Guidelines or none, the amount of
25. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1981).
26. See Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268
(1987).
27. Telephone interview with Jane Robertson Curran, Executive Director of The Florida
Bar Foundation (Mar. 7, 1988).
28. Siegel, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Programs: Do They "Take" Property of
the Client?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 674, 678 n.12 (1984). The following chart has been used to
assist lawyers in determining whether the "safe harbor" would be met:
Principal Deposit Number of Days Required to Generate
$50 Interest at 5'/,0o Compounded
Daily
$ 500 654
1000 335
2000 169
5000 69
10000 34
20000 17
30000 12
Id. at 679 (citing REPORT TO BD. OF GOVERNORS, ABA TASK FORCE AND ADVISORY BD. ON
LAWYER TRUST ACCOUNTS 24 (1982)).
29. Siegel, supra note 28, at 674 n.12. Maryland's program is codified in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 10, §§ 44-45 (1982).
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the trust deposit and the time it will be held in the account should be
the controlling factors in the determination of participation.
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Florida's IOTA plan, the first in the United States, was not the
first of its kind worldwide. Those who conceived the implementation
of an IOTA plan in Florida undoubtedly were inspired by programs
in other nations.
A. Foreign IOTA Programs
At least seventeen foreign jurisdictions had adopted IOTA pro-
grams prior to Florida's implementation in 1981.30 At that time,
IOTA plans were operating in five Australian states, nine Canadian
provinces, the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, and
Rhodesia.3 Common elements of these foreign programs included:
computation of interest earned on client trust funds through refer-
ence to an average minimum account balance; transfer of interest
directly to a law foundation for disbursal; and allocation of interest
to subsidize a variety of programs designed to improve the adminis-
tration of justice as well as to pay the claims of clients who, for
whatever reason, did not receive their trust funds.32
The Canadian plans had considerable influence on the develop-
ment of Florida's program. Former Florida Supreme Court Justice
Arthur England, generally recognized as the first to suggest Florida's
adoption of IOTA, had studied the IOTA plans of the Canadian
provinces of Ontario and of British Columbia, which had been
adopted statutorily in 1969.13 The then newly-formed Law Founda-
tion of British Columbia began receiving interest on lawyers' trust
accounts in 1970.14 Although the voluntary plan generated only
30. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 1978).
31. The five Australian states were New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, The
Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. The nine Canadian provinces were Alberta, British
Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec
and Saskatchewan. Id. at 803 n.25.
32. Id. at 803. The Florida Bar has a similar client claims program, separate from IOTA,
called the "Client Security Fund," whereby a portion of the Bar's annual dues are deposited
in a fund to be paid to those clients who for whatever reason did not receive any or all of their
trust funds.
33. Id. at 804 n.29. See B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 15, § 15 (1969). Florida's plan is not statu-
tory; it is judicially authorized pursuant to art. V, § 15 of the Florida Constitution. The ABA
recently named Former Chief Justice England a 1988 Pro Bono Publico Award recipient, in
recognition of his introduction of the IOTA concept into the United States. 74 A.B.A. J. 125
(1988).
34. Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d at 804 n. 29.
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$250,000 in its second year of operation, after it was made manda-
tory in 1976 the program generated over $2 million annually." The
Law Foundation of British Columbia utilized the funds primarily to
provide legal aid to the poor, subsidize law libraries and finance law
reform projects.3 6 The Supreme Court of Florida noted that many
features of the British Columbia plan would be "readily adaptable to
a similar program in Florida." 37
Although the Australian programs differ from state to state, all
but one share certain characteristics.3" These programs mandate that
every attorney transfer between one-third and two-thirds of the low-
est balance of a client trust account to the appropriate legal associa-
tion, which must promptly invest the funds. These funds may be
withdrawn by the attorney at any time and do not include monies
which a client has specifically requested be invested. The income
generated from the funds must be used for some type of legal assis-
tance to the poor.
B. IOTA Plans in the United States
IOTA programs come in three varieties: voluntary, opt-out, and
mandatory, the last often referred to as "comprehensive. 3 9 In states
with voluntary programs such as Florida's, attorneys who maintain
trust accounts may elect to participate but are not compelled to do
S0.40 In jurisdictions with opt-out plans, an attorney must affirma-
35. Id. at 804.
36. Id.
37. Id. One commentator has noted that some features of foreign plans have not been
incorporated into any United States IOTA plan. Examples of such features include the use of
a uniform interest rate for IOTA plans by banks and statutory prohibitions of IOTA-related
claims against participating lawyers. See Note, Minnesota's New Interest on Lawyer Trust
Accounts Program, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1286, 1290 (1983).
38. Boone, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part I: An
Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries and Florida Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds
Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Or-
ganized Bar, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 543-44 (1979) [hereinafter Boone, Part 1].
39. A comprehensive IOTA program requires an attorney either to place client funds in
an interest-bearing account for the client or to pool the funds in an account to earn interest
for IOTA. Therefore, this author will refer to this type of program as "mandatory," except
when specifically referringto other states' comprehensive programs.
40. The 29 states with voluntary programs are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and
Wyoming. The number of lawyers with trust accounts who participate in these states range
from 6007 in Maine to 9076 in Georgia, and average approximately 29%. 1988 Petition to
Amend Rules, supra note 10, at 3.
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tively act in order to refuse participation in the program. 4' States
that operate mandatory programs require attorneys either to place
client funds in an account to earn interest for the client or to place
the funds in an account to earn interest for IOTA. 42
Beyond the mandatory-voluntary distinctions, differences among
state programs are of a formalistic, and not a substantive, nature.
Every state plan provides for the transfer of interest earned on client
trust accounts to a designated legal association. The interest earned
is used for the advancement of law-related public purposes, such as
legal aid to the poor, law student scholarships and the administra-
tion of justice.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA'S IOTA PROGRAM
Four Florida Supreme Court decisions spanning several years have
shaped the IOTA program to its present form. 43 In 1971, The Florida
Bar began gathering information on IOTA programs operating in
foreign jurisdictions. Following five years of study,"4 and their for-
mal adoption of the IOTA concept, The Florida Bar and The Florida
Bar Foundation 45 presented a petition to the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida requesting amendments to the Integration Rule and the Florida
Code of Professional Responsibility to effectuate the adoption of an
IOTA program. 6
The court's opinion set forth the features of the Bar's proposal 47
41. The nine jurisdictions with opt-out plans are Alabama, Delaware, Montana, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah and the District of Columbia. Id.
42. The 10 states with comprehensive programs are Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington and Wisconsin. Id.
43. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re Interest on Trust
Accounts, 396 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1981); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67 (Fla.
1979); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978).
44. Florida Supreme Court Justice Arthur England presented a detailed proposal to The
Florida Bar's Board of Governors in 1976. England & Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust
Accounts Program, 56 FLA. B.J. 101, 102 (1982).
45. The Florida Bar Foundation (the Foundation) was chartered as a non-profit corpora-
tion in 1956 with limited membership. Prior to IOTA, the Foundation was little more than a
public relations branch of The Florida Bar with declared purposes ranging from maintaining
the honor and integrity of the legal profession to improving relations among The Florida Bar,
the judiciary, and the public. With the advent of IOTA, the Foundation amended its charter
and extended its membership to virtually all who participated in the IOTA program. See
Young, The Florida Bar Foundation: A History, 56 FLA. B.J. 108 (1982).
46. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1978).
47. The Bar's proposal contained the following features: (1) The plan would be volun-
tary; (2) The plan would be implemented through the Bar's Board of Governors' bylaws,
rather than under Integration Rule 11.02(4); (3) Funds would be invested in savings accounts
or in U.S. securities; (4) Attorneys would be allowed to set up three types of trust accounts:
interest-bearing "special accounts" for individual clients, interest-bearing "registered ac-
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and the principal criticisms of the plan. 48 Stressing that the plan
breached no ethical standards, the court found rejection of the plan
unwarranted. 49 Consequently, the court amended Florida Bar Inte-
gration Rule 11.02(4) to provide that interest earned on client funds
in authorized savings accounts be paid to The Florida Bar Founda-
tion. The Bar gave lawyers the freedom to decide whether to partici-
pate in the program, provided that lawyers first obtain client
consent.5 0 Noting that federal banking regulations historically barred
interest payments on demand accounts,5 ' the court authorized the
use of only those savings accounts which provided for the immediate
withdrawal of funds.12 The court also suggested that the Bar amend
the Foundation's charter to provide for implementation and author-
ized use of the funds for seven purposes:
(a) to provide legal aid to the poor;
(b) to provide for the adequate delivery of legal services to all
members of the public;
(c) to augment the client security fund with a view toward full
reimbursement;
(d) to fund a more expeditious and efficient grievance mechanism;
counts" for multiple clients, and non-interest bearing "general accounts" for multiple clients;
(5) Interest earned would be transferred to The Florida Bar to fund programs designed to
provide legal services to the poor, bolster the client security fund (which reimburses clients
whose trust money is misappropriated by their attorney), provide student loans, and improve
the administration of justice; and (6) There would exist a presumption of client preference for
participation in the program. Id. at 804-05.
48. Opponents of the Bar's plan argued: (1) The public should not pay for Bar programs;
(2) The plan conflicts with the Code of Professional Responsibility, tarnishes the propriety of
the legal profession, creates a potential conflict of interest, and provides an incentive for at-
torneys to bargain for financing favors with banks in exchange for their promise not to partic-
ipate in the plan; (3) The Bar presented no factual support as to present banking procedures
of attorneys with respect to client trust funds; (4) The IOTA plan seeks to circumvent federal
law which prohibits the payment of interest on demand accounts; (5) Banks can postpone
withdrawals on savings accounts for 30 days, so client funds may not be available for immedi-
ate withdrawal; and (6) Banks will be burdened with additional costs for which they will not
be compensated. Id. at 805-06. For a generalized critique of the Florida program, see Boone,
Part I, supra note 38, at 556-63. See also Note, A Critique of Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts Programs, 44 LA. L. REV. 999 (1984).
49. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 806 (Fla. 1978).
50. Id. at 807.
51. Id. at 801, 802 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1945), which states in part: "No [bank]
shall, directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest on any deposit which is
payable on demand."). The court did note, however, that the Federal Reserve Board had
asked Congress to make available throughout the nation Negotiable Order of Withdrawal
(NOW) accounts, which are similar to demand accounts but remit interest at rates comparable
to savings accounts. Id. For a thorough discussion of federal banking laws regarding interest
on savings and checking accounts, see Siegal, supra note 28, at 681-91.
52. Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 807 (Fla. 1978).
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(e) to provide student loans;
(f) to improve the administration of justice; and
(g) for such other programs for the benefit of the public as are
specifically approved by the Court from time to time. 3
The Bar Foundation did not implement the IOTA program as origi-
nally authorized because it encountered difficulties with the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). After the supreme court authorized the pro-
gram, the Foundation requested an IRS ruling to clarify that the pro-
posed use of the IOTA funds would not jeopardize its tax exempt
status.14 The IRS determined that funds generated by IOTA accounts
could be used in only four of the seven ways approved by the su-
preme court. 5 To avoid the threat of losing its tax exempt status, the
Foundation in 1979 proposed striking the uses the IRS had found
objectionable; the supreme court agreed to do SO.5 6
The program's IRS troubles did not end with the controversy over
the fund's uses. Pursuant to the Foundation's request that interest
earned in the IOTA program be declared income to the Foundation
rather than to the lawyers' clients, the IRS determined that the pro-
vision requiring client consent would invoke the assignment of in-
come doctrine, thereby making the client liable for the tax on the
interest earned in the IOTA account. 7 The Foundation informed the
53. Id. at 811.
54. England & Carlisle, supra note 44, at 103.
55. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 1979). Three uses were
omitted because they were threats to the Foundation's tax-exempt status: the provision of
adequate delivery of legal services to all members of the public, the augmentation of the Bar's
client security fund, and the funding of a more expeditious and efficient grievance mecha-
nism. Id. at n.4.
56. Id. at 68.
57. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 1981). The assignment of
income doctrine, set forth in Commissioner v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), provides that the
person who generates income through personal services or the use of property, but assigns it
to a third party to avoid tax liability, is the one who is taxed. Commissioner v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940), dictates that the person who directs or controls the income is the person who
realizes the income and therefore must bear the tax burden. The fruit of the tree metaphor is
applicable to the IOTA program. Client trust funds are the tree and the interest earned on
their use in the program is the fruit. The IRS' likely view of the initially authorized 1978
program was that the clients would have had control of their trees (their trust funds), and that
the clients' consent would have constituted the direction that the fund's fruit be paid to the
Foundation. This action would constitute assignment of income. It follows that an IOTA pro-
gram in which the client has no control of the tree and fruit, or its use, would not constitute
assignment of income.
One commentator describes an IOTA supporter's likely view of the fruit and tree analysis as
follows: "Under the plans, the client/assignor owns the tree, but that tree can bear no fruit
for the client. If the client loans or assigns the tree to a third party, then the tree will bear fruit
for the third party." Boone, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services,
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court that the IRS had confirmed that the Foundation would be the
beneficial owner of the interest generated by the program, provided
all vestiges of client control over the use or placement of the interest
earned were removed. Subsequently, the Foundation petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court to amend Integration Rule 11.02(4) to re-
move any such control. 8 The Foundation further requested that the
court make the program mandatory and permit the use of NOW ac-
counts to reflect the changes in the federal banking laws.5 9 The court
published the Foundation's proposals, sought comments from all in-
terested persons, and suspended the program until it made its rul-
ing. 60
Although the court received little response regarding the elimina-
tion of the client consent requirement, it apparently received sub-
stantial negative response to the Foundation's proposal to make the
program mandatory; the proposal was denied. 6' Revealing an ele-
ment of frustration, the court declared that "[tihe time has come
either to implement [the IOTA program], or to scrap it. We choose
to implement." ' 62 The court also declared that this would be its last
attempt to implement the plan; thereafter it would make only minor
technical changes as the need arose. 63 With that proclamation, the
court adopted the Foundation's proposals to remove client consent
and to require that NOW accounts be used in the program. Addi-
tionally, the court reaffirmed the previously adopted principles of
the plan. 64
Finally, the court addressed concerns that the program would con-
fiscate client funds in violation of the taking clause of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution. 65 The court rejected the argument
that Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith66 was control-
ling. 67 In Webb's, the United States Supreme Court found a Florida
law that declared the interest earned on funds deposited with the reg-
Part II: A Recommendation for the Use of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-
Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Texas Bar Association and an Analysis of
the Federal Income Tax Ramifications, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 134 n. 140 (1979) [hereinafter
Boone, Part II].
58. Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 391.
59. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 396 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1981). NOW accounts were
made available nationwide as of Jan. 1, 1981. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982).
60. Trust Accounts, 396 So. 2d 719.
61. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 393-94 (Fla. 1981).
62. Id. at 393.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 393-95.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66. 449 U.S. 155 (1980), discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 100-07.
67. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981).
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istry of a county court to be the property of the court clerk violative
of the taking clause. 68 The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished
the situation in Webb's and the present case: a true property interest
existed in Webb's, but none existed under the IOTA program, since
the program "creates income where there had been none before, and
the income thus created would never benefit the client under any set
of circumstances. ' 69 The court concluded that an argument that
IOTA is unconstitutional is "attenuated beyond tenability.' '70
The Supreme Court of Florida targeted September 1, 1981, as the
effective date of the revised IOTA plan. 7' However, a few details
needed to be resolved. The IRS had yet to rule on the issue of tax
liability, and federal banking regulations restricted the eligibility for
NOW accounts to individuals, fiduciaries, nonprofit organizations
and governmental entities. 72 As expected, the IRS ruled that under
the new IOTA rules the Bar Foundation, and not the client, would
be the beneficial owner of the interest earned on client trust funds. 73
Unincorporated lawyers could participate in the IOTA program, but
because of the federal banking restrictions on NOW accounts, it was
unclear whether law firms or professional associations could partici-
pate. In August 1981, the Florida Attorney General wrote an unpub-
lished opinion which concluded that The Florida Bar Foundation
was the beneficial owner of interest earned on trust accounts of law-
yers participating in the program. 74 Following this opinion, the gen-
eral counsel for the Federal Reserve Board decided that all funds,
including those held in law firm or professional association trusts,
were eligible to be maintained in NOW accounts. 75 Thus, as of 1981,
all obstacles for the effective implementation of the IOTA program
had finally been removed.
Since the program's inception, generated funds have been handled
solely by The Florida Bar Foundation. Distribution of the money has
been governed by the Foundation's own internal guidelines. Groups
wishing to receive IOTA monies must apply to the Foundation.
68. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164-65.
69. Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 395.
70. Id. at 396.
71. Id. at 396-97.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1982). See also 12 C.F.R. § 217.157 (1982).
73. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-7.
74. Letter from Jim Smith, Att'y Gen. of Fla., to E. Albert Pallot, President of The Fla.
Bar Foundation (Aug. 21, 1981), reprinted in Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts
Program-Mechanics of its Operation, 56 FLA. B.J. 115, 116 (1982).
75. Letter from Michael Bradfield to Donald M. Middlebrooks (Oct. 15, 1981), reprinted
in Middlebrooks, supra note 74, at 117.
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Grantees chosen are those the Foundation believes will best aid in the
provision of legal services to the poor and in the administration of
justice. The $3.6 million earned by the IOTA program during 1987
were distributed to thirty-nine legal aid societies and to the six ac-
credited Florida law schools for scholarships and public service fel-
lowship stipends .76
Constitutional questions surrounding Florida's program remained
unresolved as the Foundation received and distributed money
throughout Florida for three years. It was not until Cone that these
questions were finally answered.
IV. THE CONE DECISION
In February 1969, Ms. Evelyn Glaeser 77 retained the law firm of
Holland & Knight to probate her deceased husband's estate by pay-
ing a cost deposit of $100, which the firm placed in a non interest-
bearing trust account. The firm's work for Glaeser consumed all but
$13.75 of her deposit. Inadvertently failing to refund this amount to
Glaeser, Holland & Knight retained the money in the firm's non in-
terest-bearing account until December 1, 1981, when the firm de-
cided to participate in Florida's IOTA program. Accordingly, the
firm transferred its nominal and short-term trust account funds, in-
cluding Glaeser's $13.75, to an interest-bearing demand account. In
the three years Glaeser's deposit remained there, it generated $2.25
interest, which was transferred to The Florida Bar Foundation. Dis-
covering its inadvertent retention of the initial $13.75, Holland &
Knight returned $13.75 to Glaeser on September 26, 1984.71
Glaeser brought a class action suit against The Florida Bar, The
Florida Bar Foundation, and Holland & Knight 79 to recover her own
interest and all the interest earned through the program to date. 0
Federal judges in the Middle District of Florida recused themselves,
76. Telephone interview with Jane Robertson Curran, Exec. Dir. of The Fla. Bar Foun-
dation (Mar. 7, 1988).
77. Glaeser died after commencement of her suit but was replaced by Jean Ann Cone, the
personal representative of her estate. Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987). For purposes of this Comment, all references will be made
to Glaeser as the plaintiff/appellant.
78. Id. at 1003-04.
79. The defendants consisted of The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Foundation, and Hol-
land & Knight as representatives of a class of lawyers and law firms participating in the IOTA
program.
80. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. Approximately 30 state bar associations and 27 IOTA pro-
grams such as legal aid societies joined in an amicus brief on behalf of the defendants. Mar-
cotte, supra note 10, at 70.
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and a federal judge from Alabama sat by designation.8 In the suit,
Glaeser alleged that the appropriation of interest earned on her
money by the program constituted an uncompensated taking of her
property in violation of the fifth amendment,8 2 a denial of due proc-
ess and a breach of fiduciary duty.83
The district court determined that resolution of Glaeser's claim
rested on whether interest earned on nominal or short-term funds
held in an IOTA account is property of the client for the purposes of
the fifth amendment.8 4 Glaeser relied on the property doctrine that
interest follows principal to argue that she was the owner of the
$2.25 interest.85 The court disagreed: the argument "that 'interest
goes with the principal, as the fruit with the tree,' necessarily as-
sume[s] the existence of a fruit-bearing tree." '8 6 The court pointed
out that federal banking regulations precluded a law firm from
maintaining a NOW account for the private investment of client
funds and emphasized that even if her law firm could have set up
such an account, bank service charges and administration costs
would have devoured Glaeser's interest and principal.8 7 Concluding
that no protectible property interest existed, the court held that Flor-
ida's IOTA program did not violate any protected property inter-
est.88 In essence, Glaeser's tree could not bear fruit.
The district court assumed for argument's sake that even if a pro-
tectible property interest existed, Florida's IOTA program did not
violate the taking clause.8 9 This challenge, the court concluded, in-
volved a regulation of the use of property for the public good rather
than a physical invasion. The court found Andrus v. Allard 90 per-
suasive in the context of the court's assumed argument. 91 In Andrus,
the plaintiffs claimed that a law prohibiting the sale of rare migra-
tory birds constituted an unconstitutional taking in that it deprived
the plaintiffs the opportunity to earn a profit from the sale of such
81. The Alabama judge sitting by designation was the Honorable Seybourn H. Lynne.
Cone v. Florida Bar, 626 F. Supp. 132 (M.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987).
82. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
83. Cone, 626 F. Supp. at 133 n.2. The plaintiff also alleged that this taking constituted
conversion of property. Id.
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id. at 135.
86. Id. at 136 (quoting Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 319 (1809)).
87. Id. at 136.
88. Id. at 137. The court, finding the property interests protected by the taking and due
process clauses identical, dismissed both the fifth amendment and due process claims.
89. Id.
90. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
91. Cone, 626 F. Supp. at 137.
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birds. The United States Supreme Court upheld the governmental
regulation, applying a "bundle" and "strand" theory of property
rights: "The denial of one traditional property right does not always
amount to [a] taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bun-
dle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle
is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its en-
tirety. ''92
The district court determined that the IOTA program did not in-
terfere with Glaeser's "bundle" of property rights since she was able
to withdraw her funds and use them in any way she wished: "At
most, IOTA affects merely one strand of property rights by putting
otherwise dormant, non-productive, nominal or short-term client
trust deposits to work to improve the legal system." 93
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 94 Implicit in the circuit
court's opinion is the requirement that Glaeser demonstrate a consti-
tutionally recognized property interest to show a violation of the
fifth amendment's taking clause. 95 Relying on Board of Regents v.
Roth, 9 6 the court determined that for Glaeser's property interest to
rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest, she
must show that she had a specific and legitimate "claim of entitle-
ment" to the $2.25. 97 Such a claim of entitlement, the court ex-
plained, could be based on a mutually explicit understanding or on
positive rules of substantive law. 98
The court concluded that neither the history of Florida's IOTA
program nor federal banking regulations could have created a mutu-
ally explicit understanding between Glaeser and Holland & Knight
that her $13.75 would be pooled with other nominal or short-term
92. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
93. Cone, 626 F. Supp. at 137.
94. Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268
(1987).
95. For a thorough discussion of the taking clause in the IOTA context, see Siegal, supra
note 28, at 720-53. See also Baker & Wood, "Taking" a Constitutional Look at The State Bar
of Texas Proposal to Collect on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 327
(1983).
96. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In response to a procedural due process challenge, the Supreme
Court stated in pertinent part: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577. The
Supreme Court has stated that the due process clause, like the taking clause, protects constitu-
tionally recognized property interests and that the standard used in the determination of the
existence of a property interest is identical for both clauses. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 516 (1982).
97. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004.
98. Id. (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
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funds and invested to generate interest for her. The court empha-
sized that the IOTA program was set up to earn interest only for The
Florida Bar Foundation and that the federal NOW regulations, bank
service charges, and administrative costs precluded, or should have
precluded, Glaeser from expecting her nominal deposit to earn inter-
est for her. 99
The court was not persuaded by Glaeser's argument that substan-
tive law gave rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to the interest.
The only authority cited by Glaeser in support of her claim was
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith. 00 In that case the
United States Supreme Court reviewed a Florida statute'0 1 which pro-
vided that interest earned on interpleader funds deposited in the
county court registry be paid to the court clerk's office. A Florida
corporation had agreed to purchase all of Webb's assets before dis-
covering that Webb's debts exceeded the purchase price. Seeking to
protect itself under Florida's Bulk Sales Transfers Act, 0 2 the pur-
chaser filed a complaint of interpleader in circuit court and trans-
ferred the purchase price of over $1.8 million into the court registry.
During the time the funds were deposited with the court, approxi-
mately $90,000 in interest accrued. Upon removal of the funds, the
clerk deducted a service fee of approximately $9,000.101 When the
purchaser challenged the statute as an unconstitutional taking, the
Supreme Court agreed:
We hold under the narrow circumstances of this case-where there
is a separate and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk's fee "for
services rendered" based upon the amount of principal deposited
... [keeping] the interest earned on the interpleader fund while it
was in the registry of the court was a taking violative of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. We express no view as to the
constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county's retention of
interest earned, where the interest would be the only return to the
county for services it renders.l°4
99. Id. at 1006. The court stated that these costs would have consumed the $.06 per
month interest payment on her $13.75. Id. The court also noted that even if her firm could
have maintained a separate trust account for her, the subaccounting costs of approximately $2
per month would be 30 times larger than the monthly interest generated on her deposit. Id. at
n.6.
100. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
101. FLA. STAT. § 676.106(4) (1977).
102. Id. § 676.104 (1977).
103. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 157-58.
104. Id. at 165-66.
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court and distin-
guished Webb's.105 The district court had emphasized that the Su-
preme Court invalidated the Florida statute because it exacted "two
tolls": the interest accrued on the deposited funds and the service fee
charged by the clerk.'° While the Eleventh Circuit did not mention
those features, it expressly agreed with the district court's conclusion
that "[t]he crucial distinction is not the amount of interest earned,
but that the circumstances [in Webb's] led to a legitimate expectation
of interest exclusive of administrative costs and of expenses." 107
The Eleventh Circuit stated that because Glaeser's money had no
net interest value, that is, it could not earn interest standing alone,
she had no property interest in the ,amount generated. Thus, she had
nothing that could be taken in violation of the fifth amendment. The
court cautioned that it was not creating a de minimus standard for
fifth amendment takings: "We do not wish to imply that the state
may constitutionally appropriate property so long as the property is
very small property. Here, there was no taking of any property of
the plaintiff. Standing alone, her deposit in the IOTA account could
not earn anything."'' 0 8 The court chose not to rule separately on
Glaeser's due process claims, apparently affirming the district
court's holding that the taking and due process claims were identi-
cal. 109
Florida's IOTA program thus survived its greatest challenge and
received a constitutional stamp of approval by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeal. The United States Supreme Court denied Glaeser's
petition for certiorari review." 10
V. THE FUTURE OF IOTA PROGRAMS
Even after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cone, Florida's
IOTA plan, like those in other states, has a less than certain future.
105. Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
268 (1987). Several other IOTA decisions considering the taking clause violation claim have
distinguished Webb's. See Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 213 Cal. Rptr.
305 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985). In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1981); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982); In re
Adoption of Amendments to CPR 9-102, 102 Wash. 2d 1101 (1984).
106. Cone v. Florida Bar, 626 F. Supp. 132, 136 (M.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1002
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987).
107. Id. at n.7.
108. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.
109. For a general discussion of the due process and equal protection arguments in the
IOTA context, see Baker & Wood, supra note 95, at 341-46. See also Note, supra note 48, at
1021-33.
110. Cone v. Florida Bar, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987). The Supreme Court has never definitively
ruled on the constitutionality of the IOTA concept.
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Under the present scheme, the greatest threat to the future of IOTA
programs comes from advances in computer software which could
improve subaccounting capabilities and therefore reduce the admin-
istrative costs of holding small, short-term funds in interest-bearing
accounts. As a response to this threat, the Supreme Court of Florida
should amend Florida's IOTA program to make it mandatory, so the
program will achieve the ends for which it was originally designed.
A. IOTA 's Time May Be Limited
Computer software advances in the banking industry have made
possible subaccounting procedures capable of tracing small amounts
of interest.l"I Banks in New York and Boston have implemented such
procedures for use by law firms and insurance companies."12 Taking
advantage of such procedures, a firm can maintain a master account
with an unlimited number of client subaccounts; bookkeeping is
streamlined as only one monthly statement is sent to the firm." 3 Al-
though these subaccounting procedures have not yet caused a de-
crease in these IOTA program funds, IOTA directors in New York
and Massachusetts believe their funds will soon be affected."14 The
extent to which such technological advances will affect IOTA funds
is unclear. What is clear, however, is that subaccounting costs will
never be eliminated. The cost of a lawyer's time establishing a subac-
count, or even determining whether to establish one, would consume
interest generated on nominal or very short-term deposits. Still,
some of the larger short-term deposits might be able to generate in-
terest net of expenses as subaccounting costs decrease.
The above discussion raises the question of precisely what consti-
tutes a sufficiently small or short-term deposit. As noted earlier,"I5 at
least one state has outlined a "safe-harbor" amount of fifty dollars.
Florida, however, has no such standard. The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida has said that attorney discretion with respect to this determina-
tion, in the absence of clear client preference, will be protected from
review." 6 The Florida Bar Foundation has not set guidelines for de-
termining what constitutes nominal or short-term deposits, prefer-
ring instead to rely on the participating attorney's judgment. To
111. Marcotte, supra note 10, at 72.
112. Id. at 73-74. Two banks which have done so are Bankers Trust Company and State
Street Bank & Trust Company. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 74.
115. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
116. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1981).
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assume this role the Foundation would have to monitor changes in
interest rates and transaction charges by participating attorneys'
banks, placing a substantial administrative burden on the Founda-
tion. Instead, the Foundation currently relies on participating attor-
neys to monitor their own banks' charges and to determine the
placement of client funds based on this knowledge.'17
The absence of clear guidelines is a weakness of Florida's plan.
The district court in Cone, although troubled by the absence of clear
guidelines, implied that the question as to what constitutes a suffi-
ciently small and/or short-term deposit incapable of generating in-
terest independently would be irrelevant as long as the client's
"bundle" of property rights is not disturbed."' If clients are able to
withdraw trust funds at any time and use them in any way desired,
the court suggested, then the "bundle" of property rights remains
intact. 119
The threat of diminishing funds has spurred some programs to es-
tablish endowments or trust funds which might eventually generate
sufficient interest to run existing programs. 20 Other programs are
developing guidelines to see that the money is being used wisely.' 2'
B. The Case For A Mandatory IOTA
The greatest enhancement that Florida could make to its funding
of legal services to the poor would be to change its IOTA program
from a voluntary to a mandatory one. 22 After nineteen months of
operation, only fifteen percent of Florida's attorneys were partici-
pating in the program. 23 Today, nearly five years later, participation
hovers at a mere twenty percent. 124 Although IOTA participation will
probably increase somewhat due to the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that
117. Telephone interview with Jane Robertson Curran, Exec. Dir. of The Fla. Bar Foun-
dation (Mar. 7, 1988).
118. Cone v. Florida Bar, 626 F. Supp. 132, 137 (M.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1002
(1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987).
119. Id.
120. Marcotte, supra note 10, at 74. Washington state's IOTA program began setting
aside 100o of its income in a trust fund in 1985, and, as of July 1987, the fund contained
$500,000. Id.
121. Id.
122. Although the term "comprehensive" is used more often to describe a program in
which all attorneys with pooled client trust fund accounts must participate, this author uses
the term "mandatory," as it better connotes the nature of this type of program. See supra
note 39.
123. Rivlin, supra note 17, at 1038.
124. Telephone interview with Jane Robertson Curran, Exec. Dir. of The Fla. Bar Foun-
dation (Mar. 7, 1988).
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participation in IOTA is constitutional, adoption
program would raise revenues dramatically.'2 5
The following chart 2 6 confirms this contention:
of a mandatory
STATE
California (C)
New York (V)
Minnesota (C)
Colorado (V)
Ohio (C)
Texas (V)
Washington (C)
Missouri (V)
Arizona (C)
Connecticut (V)
Iowa (C)
Arkansas (V)
Wisconsin (C)
Kentucky (V)
# ELIGIBLE
ATTORNEYS
60,000
60,000 (14%)*
12,000
10,000 (29%)*
26,000
26,000 (20%)*
8,000
9,700 (36%)*
7,300
7,000 (20%)*
4,250
3,812 (260Wo)*
8,000
6,000 (23%)*
YEARS IN
OPERATION
TOTAL
INCOME
$49,000,000
$ 2,579,226
$ 6,085,078
$ 1,405,165
$ 9,906,708
$ 1,139,557
$ 6,195,765
$ 593,126
$ 4,115,115
$ 530,000
$ 1,850,790
$ 131,822
$ 773,339
$ 57,875
* percentage of eligible attorneys
tary IOLTA program in that state.
currently enrolled in the volun-
With an IOTA program of identical operational duration and
nearly the same number of eligible attorneys as that of Colorado,
Minnesota's mandatory program has raised over three times the
amount of money raised by Colorado's voluntary program.' 27 Con-
trasting the programs in New York and California proves even more
illustrative. California's mandatory program, with 60,000 attorneys,
has raised an average of nearly $10 million annually. By contrast,
New York's voluntary program, with a similar number of attorneys,
125. It has been estimated that if the nearly $2 billion deposited by attorneys in non inter-
est-bearing trust accounts nationally were placed in IOTA programs at 5 1/407o interest, ap-
proximately $100 million would be raised in one year alone. See Rivlin, supra note 17, at
1037.
126. ABA COMM'N. ON INTEREST ON LAWYERS' TRUST ACCOUNTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 3 (1988) [hereinafter ABA IOTA REPORT] (on file, Florida State University Law
Review). The ABA IOTA Report was passed as presented at the ABA's mid-year meeting held
February 4-11, 1988. Telephone interview with Deborah Baxter, ABA IOLTA Dir. (July 7,
1988).
127. Id.
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has averaged just over $600,000 annually. The ABA Commission on
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts Report to the House of Dele-
gates (ABA IOTA Report) concluded that of the $121 million raised
by the forty-four IOTA programs to date, the eight mandatory pro-
grams have yielded $79 million, or sixty-five percent of the total. 128
If Florida's IOTA program were made mandatory, money and
time spent urging participation in the program could be redirected
into the program itself. No constitutional questions or uncertainties
restrain the program today. 129 Of the IOTA concept, one commenta-
tor has noted: "It does not cost the state any money and it is not an
unreasonable burden on the banks. Yet its potential for doing a great
deal of good is enormous."' 130 Still, as the ABA IOTA Report seems
to indicate, full potential can be met only with the imposition of
mandatory participation.
The Florida Bar Foundation's initial request that the supreme
court make Florida's IOTA plan mandatory met strong resistance.' 3'
Critics argued that a mandatory program would: (1) burden attor-
neys with new recordkeeping requirements; (2) deprive clients of
their earnings; (3) malign the public image of the legal profession;
(4) create potential disciplinary problems for attorneys; (5) cause an
increase in attorney malpractice insurance rates; (6) interfere with at-
torney-client relationships; and (7) interfere with attorney-banker re-
lationships."' Although opponents offered no factual basis for these
claims, the supreme court was sufficiently impressed to delay adop-
tion of a mandatory scheme.
Of the seven arguments, the first six are unfounded. First, the
charge that a mandatory IOTA program would burden attorneys
with new recordkeeping requirements exaggerates the imposition.
Participation in the current voluntary plan requires little bookkeep-
ing, only time to fill out and send two simple forms to the Founda-
tion. A mandatory plan would create little, if any, additional
burden.
128. Id.
129. However, at least one commentator has suggested that if Florida's program were
made mandatory it would constitute taxation without representation and therefore be uncon-
stitutional. See Note, Interest on Attorney Trust Accounts: A Questionable Approach in Flor-
ida, 8 STETSON L. REV. 413, 427 (1979). Moreover, the lack of guidelines as to what amount
of money is nominal and what amount of time is short-term could lead to another court chal-
lenge. The lack of guidelines was not addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Cone v. State Bar
of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987).
130. Civiletti & Machen, The Case for IOLTA, 70 A.B.A. J. 16 (1984) (emphasis added).
131. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1981).
132. Id.
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Second, the argument that clients of attorneys who participate in
Florida's IOTA program are deprived of their earnings was dis-
proved by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cone. As the court
pointed out, the IOTA program utilizes only those funds which
could not generate sufficient interest to cover administrative charges.
Using these funds consequently deprives the client of nothing.
Third, the charge that IOTA maligns the public image of the legal
profession is untrue. If anything, a mandatory IOTA would enhance
the profession's image. Interest earned would go to law-related pub-
lic services such as the delivery of legal services to the poor, rather
than to subsidize mutually beneficial attorney-banker relationships.
Fourth, the charge that a mandatory IOTA program would lead to
an increase in attorney malpractice insurance rates is grounded on
the assumption that IOTA is unconstitutional and assumes that cli-
ents could seek restitution for lost funds. The Cone decision dis-
pelled this argument as well.
Fifth, the argument that a mandatory IOTA program would inter-
fere with attorney-client relationships is a spurious one. Undoubt-
edly, most clients who know their trust funds are insufficiently large
or long-term to earn interest net of expenses for them would not ob-
ject to the use of their funds in the program. In addition, a client's
participation in the determination of whether to place funds in the
IOTA program is precluded by the assignment of income doctrine,
which would result in the client's suffering tax consequences. In any
event, the attorney-client relationship would not appear to suffer
substantially.
The sixth charge, that a mandatory program would generate disci-
plinary problems, is also unfounded. As noted earlier, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
determined participation in an IOTA program to be ethical.'33 While
the opinion does not address mandatory programs in particular, the
ABA has unanimously recommended that states with voluntary
IOTA programs convert to mandatory ones. 34
Only the seventh charge, that a mandatory IOTA plan would in-
terfere with attorney-banker relations, is true. A mandatory program
would interfere with agreements, express and implied, that an attor-
ney deposit all client trust funds with the bank and agree not to par-
ticipate in the IOTA program. In exchange for the bank's free use of
these funds, an attorney or firm often receives a low-interest loan or
133. See ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 12.
134. See ABA IOTA Report, supra note 126.
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free banking services. Such an agreement is discretely referred to as a
"compensating balances" relationship.
While not expressly proscribed by any of the rules regulating attor-
neys, the practice of "compensating balances" is nevertheless shad-
owed by accusations of professional impropriety. This was suggested
during oral argument of In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Services
to the Poor,'35 which involved a petition to amend the Integration
Rule of The Florida Bar to require mandatory pro bono services of
state bar members. The proposed amendment would have required
Bar members annually to donate either twenty-five hours of legal
service to the poor or $500 to The Florida Bar Foundation, or to
participate in Florida's IOTA program. 3 6 In a pleading urging denial
of the amendment, the Palm Beach County Bar Association offered
the following argument:
For many lawyers and firms, participation in IOTA will remain
unattractive. What if a lawyer or firm has a long-standing,
cherished, and valuable relationship with a banking institution
which frowns on IOTA participation? If the lawyer or firm
represents the bank, there may be a significant risk of losing some
or all of the bank's legal business. Even if that risk is slight, or even
if the lawyer or firm does not represent the bank, there could be a
very real loss of economic power to obtain financing on favored
terms. 137
At oral argument, former Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice
James Alderman said that "lawyers are not supposed to earn interest
or otherwise gain from their clients' trust accounts," and questioned
whether the lawyers' borrowing posture is an ethical consideration.'38
Chief Justice Alderman may have based his remark on Canon 11
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which prohibits a lawyer from
using a client's money for his personal benefit; 3 9 or on Canon 9 of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
135. 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983).
136. Id. at 40.
137. Response of Palm Beach County Bar Ass'n to Emergency Petition to Amend the
Integration Rule By the Addition of an Article Entitled "Delivery of Legal Services to the
Poor," No. 62,889 (on file, Florida State University Law Review). The supreme court denied
the Petition. In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla.
1983).
138. Miami Herald, Feb. 12, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
139. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETICS Canon 11 (1908) ("Money of the client . . . coming
into the possession of the lawyer ... should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him.").
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a lawyer should avoid "even the appearance of impropriety. 1 40 Al-
though the more recent Model Code's Canon 9 does not contain the
exact language of Canon 11, the ABA has noted that the drafters of
the Model Code had no intention of relaxing the longstanding res-
trictions on the use of client funds. 141
The Supreme Court of Florida underscored the Canon 11 standard
when it noted in Jungbluth v. American Bank and Trust Co. 142 that
"[n]o rule of law is better settled than that a trustee cannot use trust
property or his relation to it for his personal advantage. 1 43 The
court has also noted that "[flew breaches of ethics are as serious as
the commingling of a client's funds and the use thereof for the law-
yer's private purposes."'" Undoubtedly, the receipt of a low-interest
loan or free banking services constitutes a personal benefit. Thus,
the "compensating balances" relationships between attorneys and
their banks appear to constitute a breach of ethics. As the Model
Code's Canon 9 cautions, lawyers should guard against "even the
appearance of impropriety." 45
In 1967, the ABA declared that the use of interest earned on a
pooled client fund savings account to defray costs of a law firm's
account would violate Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.14 6 Practices found in "compensating balances" relationships
such as the exchange of the free use of interest for free banking serv-
ices or low-interest loans appear to constitute the type of practice
condemned by the ABA as early as 1967. On the state level, the
Ethics Committee of The Florida Bar has ruled that a lawyer's earn-
ing a secret commission through the placement of client funds in a
bank, without client knowledge and consent, is unethical. 47 A law-
yer's tacit receipt of benefits from a bank free of charge-benefits
that would otherwise cost money-is tantamount to obtaining a "se-
cret commission." Thus, the Ethics Committee of The Florida Bar
has also condemned the practices found in the "compensating bal-
ances" relationship.
140. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980). In 1970, Florida
adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1986, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida adopted the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. See In re Rules Regulating The
Fla. Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986), modified, 507 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1987).
141. ABA Informal Op. 348, supra note 12.
142. 101 Fla. 289, 134 So. 618 (1931).
143. Id. at 291, 134 So. at 619.
144. State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1961).
145. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
146. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 991 (1967), excerpted in 68
A.B.A. J. 1502, 1504 (1982).
147. The Florida Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Advisory Op. 63-14 (July 11, 1963).
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A court in at least one other state has recognized this conflict. In
Meyer v. Meyer,'48 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that trus-
tees who deposited trust funds with a bank that granted them a low-
interest loan would be liable for the profits made by the use of the
funds if the low-interest loan was conditioned upon the deposit of
the funds with the bank. ,49 The trustees in Meyer, who were engaged
in a "compensating balances" relationship with their bank, were
held liable for the profits earned from the use of the trust funds.
Should not lawyers engaging in "compensating balances" relation-
ships with banks today be held similarly liable?
The American Bar Association, The Florida Bar, and the courts of
a nearby state have all condemned the "compensating balances" re-
lationship. At the very least, these rulings have cast an appearance of
impropriety over this behavior. Accordingly, these practices should
be discontinued. However, it is unrealistic to assume that all attor-
neys will end such relationships absent an advisory opinion to that
effect. It is not known how pervasive these practices are, but logic
suggests that many attorneys refusing to participate in Florida's pro-
gram have chosen so in order to perpetuate an economically benefi-
cial "compensating balances" relationship. Making Florida's
program mandatory would obviate the conflict. Given a choice, it is
likely that many attorneys would prefer a mandatory IOTA program
to a program like the one considered in In re Delivery of Legal Serv-
ices to the Poor,150 which would have required attorneys to perform
a certain amount of pro bono work each year or pay an annual fee to
a state legal aid program. Absent other improvements to the delivery
of legal services to the poor, such a proposal could be adopted. A
mandatory IOTA program would improve the provision of legal
services to the poor, but would not be as intrusive, at least in terms
of attorney time and expense, as a mandatory pro bono program.
On April 6, 1988, State Representatives Lawson, Gordon, and
Rudd filed House Bill 1191, which required Florida Bar members to
create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account for nominal or
short-term client funds for the benefit of The Florida Bar Founda-
tion. 15' This legislation also provided that the Foundation administer
the proceeds for the benefit of low-income persons unable to afford
private legal counsel and for the administration of justice,' 5 2 essen-
148. 6 Miss. 638, 64 So. 420 (1914).
149. Id. at 647, 64 So. at 425.
150. 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983).
151. FIa. HB 1191 (1988).
152. Id.
1988]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tially the same purposes as those contained in Florida's current vol-
untary plan. Finally, the bill specified that, except as provided in the
legislation, all such interest-bearing trust accounts be governed by
the applicable rules of the Supreme Court of Florida. The legislation
would have become effective on October 1, 1988.'1 Senators Frank,
Thomas, Jenne and Grant filed identical legislation, Senate Bill 988,
on April 7, 1988. 154
Neither bill emerged from committee. House Bill 1191 was re-
ferred to the House Judiciary Committee on April 12, 1988, and sub-
sequently subreferred to the Subcommittee on Court Systems,
Probate and Consumer Law.' 55 The bill was never put on the com-
mittee agenda and died in committee.'56 Senate Bill 988 suffered a
similar fate: it was referred to the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee
on April 18, 1988,117 but was never placed on the committee agenda,
even though three time extensions were granted. 5 '
A letter from Representative Hamilton Upchurch, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, to Chief Justice Parker Lee Mc-
Donald of the Supreme Court of Florida, suggests why these bills
died.15 9 In the letter, Representative Upchurch expressed his concern
that the House Bill sought to regulate an aspect of legal practice
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. 160 Representative Up-
church concluded that the issue would be more appropriately ad-
dressed in the judicial rather than legislative forum. 161.
The Florida Bar Foundation is currently implementing a drive to
increase participation in the voluntary program. In addition, on July
5, 1988, the Foundation petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for
a rule change creating a comprehensive IOTA program for the
state. 62 In May 1988, The Florida Bar Board of Governors voted to
153. Id.
154. Fla. SB 988 (1988).
155. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1988 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 272, HB 1191.
156. Id.
157. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1988 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 230, SB 988.
158. Id.
159. Letter from Rep. Hamilton D. Upchurch to then-Chief Justice Parker Lee McDonald
of the Supreme Court of Florida (Apr. 13, 1988) (on file, Florida State University Law Re-
view).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The Foundation's specific request was for entry of an Order modifying the Rules
Regulating Trust Accounts by amending Rule 5-1.1(d) of the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar. 1988 Petition to Amend Rules, supra note 10, at 1. As of this writing, the supreme court
has heard oral argument but has not rendered a decision.
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endorse the Foundation's petition on the conditions that the Board
be given authority to appoint The Florida Bar Foundation Directors
and that ten percent of IOTA proceeds be alloted to a fund promot-
ing public information programs relating to the legal system. 163 But
on September 30, 1988, the Board voted 22-19 to withdraw support
for a comprehensive program, endorsing instead a mandatory IOTA
program with an opt-out provision. 16 4
Opt-out programs are currently in use in eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 165 where attorneys are required to participate ab-
sent the attorney's affirmative request not to participate. If the
supreme court decides against adopting a mandatory program, the
court could fall back on the opt-out approach. Such a change would
capture the participation of those attorneys unaware of the IOTA
program. Nevertheless, an opt-out program would not reach those
who wish to maintain a "compensating balances" relationship with
their banks. Accordingly, adoption of a mandatory IOTA program
would be preferable to an opt-out program. In addition to creating a
greater funding base, the mandatory program would eliminate ex-
pensive, time-consuming recruitment drives as well as the shadow of
impropriety surrounding the "compensating balances" issue. As the
court considers the alternatives, the Ethics Committee of The Flor-
ida Bar should render an advisory opinion on the "compensating
balances" relationship that exists between many attorneys and banks
in Florida.
The Supreme Court of Florida should amend The Florida Bar's
Rules to make the state's IOTA program mandatory. First, the
American Bar Association 66 has recommended that the program be
made mandatory. Second, this court has long recognized the unavail-
ability of adequate legal representation for Florida's lower-income
residents, as well as its own obligation to promote the delivery of
legal services to all aspects of society. 67 A mandatory IOTA pro-
gram would undoubtedly raise additional funds which could be used
to increase the availability of legal services to the poor.
163. Telephone interview with Jane Robertson Curran, Exec. Dir. of The Fla. Bar Foun-
dation (May 23, 1988). The Directors are currently named through automatic appointments,
by the Board or judiciary, or through elections at an annual meeting. Press Release of The
Florida Bar (May 25, 1988) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
164. Comprehensive IOTA Support Dropped, Fla. Bar News, Oct. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
165. Seesupranote 41.
166. See ABA IOTA REPORT, supra note 126.
167. See Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the Supreme Court of Florida to Promote the
FullAvailability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION
After nearly ten years of study and review, tangles with the IRS,
and struggle over changes in federal banking regulations, Florida's
Interest on Trust Account program became a reality in late 1981.
Four years and nearly $6 million later, the program faced a challenge
that it constituted an uncompensated taking in violation of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In
Cone v. State Bar of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida's
program was constitutional, and the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari. As a result, new life was given to Florida's program as well as
to those of the forty-seven states and the District of Columbia which
had fashioned their own programs largely after Florida's. The future
of all state programs, however, remains somewhat unclear, as ad-
vances in subaccounting procedures threaten to diminish the pool of
available funds. Nevertheless, the prospects of a healthy future for
Florida's IOTA plan can be enhanced by the establishment of en-
dowment funds and, more importantly, the adoption of a mandatory
program.
The Florida IOTA plan has had a positive effect on the provision
of legal services to the poor in the state. Just when the federal gov-
ernment began cutting back allocations to state legal aid programs,
IOTA funds filled some gaps. However, legal aid societies and pro-
grams are still seriously underfunded. Action by the Supreme Court
of Florida imposing mandatory participation in the IOTA plan by all
Florida attorneys would result in increased funding of these pro-
grams and would put an end to "compensating balances" relation-
ships between attorneys and their banks. IOTA is constitutional.
Now is the time to make it mandatory.
